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Abstract
Collective migration of animals in a cohesive group is rendered possible by a strategic distribution of
tasks among members: some track the travel route, which is time and energy-consuming, while the others
follow the group by interacting among themselves. In this paper, we study a social dynamics system
modeling collective migration. We consider a group of agents able to align their velocities to a global
target velocity, or to follow the group via interaction with the other agents. The balance between these
two attractive forces is our control for each agent, as we aim to drive the group to consensus at the
target velocity. We show that the optimal control strategies in the case of final and integral costs consist
of controlling the agents whose velocities are the furthest from the target one: these agents sense only
the target velocity and become leaders, while the uncontrolled ones sense only the group, and become
followers. Moreover, in the case of final cost, we prove an "Inactivation" principle: there exist initial
conditions such that the optimal control strategy consists of letting the system evolve freely for an initial
period of time, before acting with full control on the agent furthest from the target velocity.
Introduction
A fascinating feature of large groups is their self-organization ability, i.e. the emergence from local interaction
rules of certain global patterns. For instance, animal groups such as schools of fish, flocks of birds or herds
of mammals exhibit strong coordination in their movements, see e.g. [2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 29, 30, 31, 36, 39, 40].
This collective behavior in animal groups also inspired applications to robotics (see [4]), in which the aim
is to coordinate autonomous vehicles [9, 23, 27, 38] and flight formations [33, 37]. Other interests concern
models in microbiology [21, 22, 24, 32, 34], pedestrian and crowd motions [12, 13] and financial markets
[1, 16, 25]. Such systems are usually referred to as social dynamics. Examples of self-organization include
clustering of the agents, alignment of velocities, or other kinds of equilibria, see [6, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39].
This raises the question of understanding the mechanisms behind the global pattern formation.
A well-known model was proposed by F. Cucker and S. Smale (see [14]) to describe the phenomenon of
consensus in terms of alignment of velocities in a group on the move. The Cucker-Smale model in formula
is written as: 
x˙i = vi
v˙i =
1
N
N∑
j=1
vj − vi
(1 + ‖xj − xi‖2)β
for i ∈ {1, ..., N}, (1)
where β > 0, and xi ∈ Rd and vi ∈ Rd are respectively the state and velocity. This model was originally
designed to describe the formation and evolution of language, and the variables vi can more generally
represent opinions, preferences or invested capital. The system converges to consensus if β ≤ 12 , which
corresponds to a strong interaction even between distant agents, see [7, 8]. On the other hand, if β >
1
2 , i.e. if the interaction is too weak, convergence to consensus only happens under certain conditions.
More generally, the term (1 + ‖xj − xi‖2)−β can be replaced by a(‖xj − xi‖). Intuitively, it is natural to
define a as a non-increasing function, since proximity often encourages interaction. On the other hand, it
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was proven that interactions modeled by non-decreasing functions a, called heterophilious, in fact enhance
consensus (see [28]). When the system does not converge to a desired state, a natural question is to study
the possibility of steering it via controls functions ui, in which case the second equation of (1) becomes:
v˙i =
1
N
∑N
j=1 a(‖xj − xi‖)(vj − vi) + ui (see [7, 8, 17]).
In the collective migration problem (see [26]), not only do agents interact with one another to travel as
a group, but they also gather clues from the environment guiding them towards a global target velocity. In
the case of migrating birds, for instance, this velocity can be sensed through a magnetic field, the direction
of the sun, or environmental features. However, sensing the migration velocity is costly, both in used time
and energy. A trade-off thus occurs between gathering this information, which ensures more precision, and
following the group, which is less costly and saves time and energy for other tasks such as surveying for
predators [15, 19]. This problem also applies to the field of robotics, in which gathering information from
the environment is done at the expense of communicating with other robots (or planes, drones, etc.) or
performing other tasks, and to the field of economics when one aims to influence decisions of a group based
on limited information. This trade-off naturally separates the group into leaders, who gather information,
and followers, who only interact with the other agents (see [19]).
We study a Collective Migration Model, where the agents’ dynamics is determined by two forces: the
attraction towards a target velocity V (which we assume can be sensed) and the consensus dynamics as in
the Cucker-Smale model. More precisely, each agent’s evolution is governed by a parameter αi ∈ [0, 1] which
provides the balance between the two forces. The system can be written as:
x˙i = vi
v˙i = αi(V − vi) + (1− αi)
1
N
N∑
j=1
a(‖xj − xi‖)(vj − vi) for i ∈ {1, ..., N}, (2)
where xi ∈ Rd and vi ∈ Rd are the state and velocity, V ∈ Rd is the target velocity, and αi ∈ [0, 1] is the
control, with the constraint
∑
i αi ≤M , M > 0. In this paper, we choose to set a ≡ 1, so that the strength
of interaction does not depend on the agents’ positions. This is a reasonable hypothesis for instance if we
consider groups of planes or drones that can communicate just as easily from great distances.
While the Cucker-Smale model leads to alignment of all velocities to the average one (when there is
consensus), the migration model tends to align all velocities to the preassigned target velocity. Our work
focuses on finding optimal control strategies in order to achieve consensus to the target velocity, and in
particular on selecting optimal controlled leaders among the agents when the control strength M is small
with respect to the size of the group. In order to do that, we define the cost function V˜ = 1N
∑
i ‖vi − V ‖2,
measuring the distance from consensus at the target velocity. We first show that, given any M > 0, the
strategy to decrease V˜ instantaneously, with the constraint
∑
i αi ≤ M , consists of distributing the control
among the agents with the largest positive projections of velocities along v¯−V (where v¯ is the mean velocity).
In particular, if 〈vi, v¯ − V 〉 < 0, the agent i is not controlled (αi = 0).
We then study the optimal control strategy to minimize V˜ at a fixed final time and first focus on the case
of two agents, with control bounded by M ∈ [0, 2]. The optimal control strategies depend on M but, in all
cases, we act with larger control on the agent with the largest projected velocity. Furthermore, if the final
time is too short to bring the agents together, then there are initial conditions for which at first the system
must evolve with no control (α ≡ 0). We call this phenomenon "Inactivation", in line with the "Inactivation
Principle" proven in [18] in the context of arm movements. In this collaborative work with biologists, the
authors prove that during fast arm movements, it is optimal to simultaneously inactivate both agonistic and
antagonistic muscles for a short moment nearing the peak velocity. We next generalize our results to any
number of agents, but with the constraint M ≤ 1. Then the optimal control strategy acts with full strength
on a sub-group of agents to bring them together. Also in this case we observe "Inactivation", which occurs
when the initial average velocity v¯ is very close to the target velocity V . Indeed, driving the system to
V requires both achieving consensus and moving the average velocity towards V . If the average velocity
is already close to V , then we are left with inducing consensus which happens naturally without control.
However, simulations show that Inactivation is rare and its performance gain is very minor compared to a
full-control strategy.
Then we move on to examine integral costs
∫ T
0
V˜(t)dt and show that the optimal control strategy never
exhibits Inactivation. More precisely, we must use full control at all time splitting it evenly among the agents
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with the biggest projected velocity. Such a strategy is more restrictive than that with final cost, since the
controls are completely determined by initial conditions, while previously we could use any strategy bringing
agents together at final time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we define the cost functional and make general obser-
vations. In Section 2, we determine the strategy to decrease it instantaneously in time. Then, in Section 3,
we introduce the optimal control problem to minimize the cost function at a given final time. We solve it
for the particular case of two agents (Section 4) before generalizing to any number of agents with a control
bounded by 1 (Section 5). Lastly we find optimal control strategies to minimize the integral cost (Section
6).
1 Cost function and general observations
With no loss of generality, we set the target velocity V to zero. Having simplified the interaction function
a, system (2) reduces to: 
x˙i = vi
v˙i = −αivi + (1− αi)
1
N
N∑
j=1
(vj − vi) i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (3)
We set a final time T > 0. Then given M > 0, we define the set of controls UM as:
UM =
{
α : [0, T ]→ [0, 1]N
∣∣∣ α measurable, s.t. for all t, N∑
i=1
αi(t) ≤M
}
. (4)
1.1 Projection of the Dynamics
Note that the dynamics (3) can be written in the more compact way:{
x˙i = vi
v˙i = −vi + (1− αi) v¯,
(5)
where v¯ represents the mean velocity v¯ = 1N
∑
i vi. The evolution of v¯ is given by ˙¯v = − 1N (
∑
i αi)v¯, so the
direction of v¯ is an invariant of the dynamics. We begin by assuming that the initial average velocity is
different from the target one:
Hypothesis 1. v¯(0) 6= 0.
This first assumption is only made in order to render the problem interesting. Indeed, if v¯(0) = 0, i.e.
if the mean velocity is already at the target velocity V , then according to the evolution ˙¯v = −(∑i αi)v¯, it
would hold v¯(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Then looking at Equation (5), we notice that the system is not controllable
and that each velocity decreases exponentially to zero. We can then define the invariant unit vector e = v¯‖v¯‖ .
Let wi = vi − 〈vi, e〉 e be the projection of vi over (v¯⊥). Then
w˙i = −vi + (1− αi) v¯ − 〈−vi + (1− αi) v¯, e〉 e = −wi.
Therefore the projection of vi over (v¯⊥) decreases exponentially, independently of the controls αi. Let us now
define ξi = 〈vi, e〉. Its evolution is given by: ξ˙i = −〈vi, e〉+(1−αi)〈v¯, e〉 = −ξi+(1−αi)‖v¯‖ = −ξi+(1−αi)ξ¯.
In the following, we will only study the equations governing the evolution of the projected variables ξi:
For all i ∈ {1, ..., N}, ξ˙i = −ξi + (1− αi)ξ¯, (6)
where ξ¯ = 1N
∑
j ξj . This is a significant result: instead of studying a system evolving in RNd, we consider
a system in RN , thus greatly reducing the complexity of theoretical and numerical analyses. Hereafter we
shall make the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2. ξi(0) ≥ ξi+1(0) for every i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}.
This assumption allows us to order the initial projected velocities without loss of generality.
Proposition 1.1.
Having made Hyp. 1 and Hyp. 2, it holds v¯(t) 6= 0 and ξ¯(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Furthermore, let τ ∈ [0, T ]. If ξi(τ) ≥ 0, then ξi(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [τ, T ]. If ξi(τ) > 0, then ξi(t) > 0 for all
t ∈ [τ, T ].
Proof. The proposition is mainly a consequence of Gronwall’s inequality: It holds
ξ¯ =
1
N
∑
j
〈vj , v¯‖v¯‖〉 = 〈v¯,
v¯
‖v¯‖〉 = ‖v¯‖ (7)
and
˙¯ξ = − 1
N
(∑
i=1
αi
)
ξ¯ ≥ −M
N
ξ¯.
Hence, if v¯(0) 6= 0 and therefore ξ¯(0) > 0, then ξ¯(t) ≥ e−Mt/N ξ¯(0) > 0 and thus v¯(t) 6= 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Now notice that from (6) we can compute for all t ∈ [τ, T ]: ξi(t) = e−(t−τ)(ξi(τ) +
∫ t
τ
(1−αi)(s)ξ¯(s)es−τds),
so ξi(t) ≥ e−(t−τ)ξi(τ), which proves the second part of the proposition.
1.2 Migration functional
We introduce the functional
V˜ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖vi − V ‖2, (8)
which measures the distance from consensus at the desired velocity V . Since we set V = 0, V˜ reduces
to: V˜ = 1N
∑
i ‖vi‖2. In the new projected coordinates ξ, the migration functional can be written as:
V˜ = 1N
∑
i(‖wi‖2 + ξ2i ), where only the second term ξ2i can be controlled. Hence, here onward we will only
consider the controllable part of V˜, which we denote V:
V =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξ2i . (9)
Notice that V can be written as a sum of two terms:
V = ξ¯2 +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ξi − ξ¯)2, (10)
which should be minimized simultaneously (where we remind that ξ¯ = 1N
∑
i ξi). Minimizing ξ¯
2 (or ξ¯, since
according to Proposition 1.1, ξ¯ > 0) corresponds to steering the system as a whole to the desired velocity
V = 0. On the other hand, minimizing 1N
∑
i(ξi − ξ¯)2 corresponds to driving the system to consensus.
However, the dynamics (6) of ξi show that if ξi < 0, decreasing ξ¯ slows down the increase of ξi, resulting in a
possible increase of (ξi − ξ¯)2. Hence, minimizing V requires balancing the decrease of the two terms in (10).
1.3 Minimization problems
In the following sections, we will deal with the minimization of different quantities, in order to design a
strategy for consensus at the migration velocity V = 0. Having fixed the final time T a priori, we address
three problems:
(i) The minimization of dVdt , i.e. the maximization of the instantaneous decrease of V (see Section 2).
(ii) The minimization of the final cost V(T ) (see Sections 3, 4 and 5).
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(iii) The minimization of the integral cost
∫ T
0
V(t)dt (see Section 6).
In order to minimize (ii) V(T ) and (iii)
∫ T
0
V(t)dt, we will design an optimal control strategy using
Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The minimization of V˙, on the other hand, will not provide an optimal
control.
2 Instantaneous Decrease
In this section we look for a control strategy maximizing the instantaneous decrease of V. Strategies designed
in this way are not optimal (in general), but are easier to study and can give a first good insight on the
problem. Indeed, we will later compare the instantaneous decrease strategy to the optimal control strategies
developed in Sections 5 and 6.
The time derivative of the migration functional V is given by:
V˙ =
2
N
N∑
i=1
ξiξ˙i =
2
N
(
N∑
i=1
−ξ2i +
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)ξ¯ξi
)
= −2V+ 2
N
ξ¯
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)ξi.
Since ξ¯ ≥ 0, minimizing V˙ amounts to the following problem:
Find min
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)ξi,
which can be done as follows (where bMc and dMe respectively denote the floor and the ceiling of M , and
| · | denotes the cardinality of a set):
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that ξ1(t) ≥ ... ≥ ξN (t) (or re-arrange the agents so that this is satisfied). Then
the following strategy minimizes ddtV at time t:
Define I+(t) = {i ∈ {1, .., N}, ξi(t) > 0}.
If |I+(t)| ≤M , then set αi(t) = 1 if i ∈ I+ and αi(t) = 0 otherwise.
If |I+(t)| > M and ξdM−1e > ξdMe > ξdM+1e then set αi(t) = 1 if i ≤ bMc, αbMc+1(t) = M − bMc and
αi(t) = 0 otherwise.
If |I+(t)| > M and ξdM−1e = ξdMe or ξdMe = ξdM+1e, let IdMe = {i ∈ {1, ..., N}, ξi(t) = ξdMe(t)} and
I∗dMe = {1, ..., dMe} \ IdMe . Then set αi(t) = 1 if i ∈ I∗dMe, αi(t) =
M−|I∗dMe|
|IdMe| if i ∈ IdMe and αi(t) = 0
otherwise.
3 Optimal control for final cost
In this section, we focus on problem (ii) (see Section 1.3), i.e. minimizing the migration functional V at final
time T using Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
Let us compute the Hamiltonian H of the scalar system (6):
H =
N∑
i=1
λi
(−ξi + (1− αi)ξ¯) = −ξ¯ N∑
i=1
αiλi +
N∑
i=1
λi
(−ξi + ξ¯) . (11)
By Pontryagin’s maximum principle [35], if α ∈ UM , associated with the trajectory ξ, is optimal on [0, T ],
then there exists λ : [0, T ]→ RN such that ξ˙ = ∂H∂λ and λ˙ = −∂H∂ξ . Furthermore the following minimization
condition holds for almost all t ∈ [0, T ]:
H(t, ξ(t), λ(t), α(t)) = min
β∈UM
H(t, ξ(t), λ(t), β(t)). (12)
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Since ξ¯ ≥ 0, minimizing H requires to set αi = 1 on the biggest positive λi. The differential equation for
the covectors λi gives:
λ˙i = −∂H
∂ξi
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
αjλj − λ¯+ λi, i ∈ {1, ..., N}. (13)
From this we can also compute the evolution of λ¯ = 1N
∑
i λi:
˙¯λ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
αjλj . (14)
Since the final condition for ξ is not fixed, the final condition for λ at time T gives:
λ(T ) = ∇V(ξ(T )) =
(
2
N
ξ1(T ), ...,
2
N
ξN (T )
)
. (15)
Proposition 3.1. If t¯ > 0, i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} , and λi(t¯) = λj(t¯), then λi(t) = λj(t) for all t. In this case, for
a given control α, any control α˜ satisfying α˜i + α˜j = αi + αj and α˜k = αk for every k 6= i, j gives the same
evolution of λ. If the control α satisfies the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, then the control α˜ also does.
Proof. Assume that at time t¯, λi(t¯) = λj(t¯). Let us define zij = λi − λj . The evolution of zij is given by:
z˙ij = λ˙i − λ˙j = λi − λj = zij . Hence, zij(t) = zij(t¯)et−t¯, and if zij(t¯) = 0, then for all t, zij(t) = 0, i.e.
λi(t) = λj(t). From this it follows that if α minimizes the Hamiltonian H, then any control α˜ satisfying
α˜i + α˜j = αi + αj and α˜k = αk also minimizes H, since one easily sees from (11) that Hα = H α˜ (where we
denote by Hα the Hamiltonian obtained with the control function α).
Still assuming that the projected velocities are initially ordered (Hypothesis 2), the following lemma will
allow us to further assume that they are ordered at all time.
Lemma 3.2.
There exists an optimal strategy satisfying the following: For all t ∈ [0, T ],
If i < j, then ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t). (16)
Proof. Consider an optimal control strategy α ∈ UM .
Define τ = sup{t ∈ [0, T ]; ∃β ∈ UM s.t. Vβ(T ) = Vα(T ) and ξβ satisfies (16) on [0, t]}, where Vβ and ξβ
denote respectively the migration functional and the dynamics driven by the control β. Let us prove by
contradiction that τ = T . Suppose that τ < T . Then there exist i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} with i < j such that
ξβi (τ) = ξ
β
j (τ) and ξ
β
j (t) > ξ
β
i (t) on ]τ, τ + δ] for some δ > 0. Design a control strategy β˜ such that on
[τ, T ], β˜i = βj , β˜j = βi and for every k ∈ {1, ..., N} \ {i, j}, β˜k = βk. Then for all t ∈ [τ, T ], ξβ˜i (t) = ξβj (t),
and ξβ˜j (t) = ξ
β
i (t). So for all t ∈ [τ, τ + δ], ξβ˜i (t) ≥ ξβ˜j (t) and Vβ˜(T ) = Vβ(T ). Proceeding likewise for every
pair of indices (m,n) satisfying m < n and ξβm(t) < ξβn(t) on ]τ, τ +δ] we are able to design a control strategy
β˜ satisfying (16) on [0, τ + δ] and Vβ˜(T ) = Vα(T ), which contradicts the definition of τ . In conclusion,
τ = T , i.e. for all t ∈ [0, T ], for every i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, if i < j then ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t).
Hence, from here onward we shall assume that the variables ξi are ordered at all time.
Hypothesis 3. If i < j, then ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
From Hyp.3 and the transversality condition (15), we know that the covectors are ordered at final time, i.e.
λ1(T ) ≥ ... ≥ λN (T ). From Prop. 3.1, we can generalize this for any time t:
λ1(t) ≥ ... ≥ λN (t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (17)
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle allows us to state the following:
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Proposition 3.3. The optimal strategy requires controlling the agents with the biggest positive covectors.
Let α ∈ UM be an optimal strategy and λi, i ∈ {1, ..., N} the corresponding covectors. Define:
Iλ(t) :=
{
i ∈ {1, ..., N}
∣∣∣ λi(t) ≥ 0} and I+λ (t) := {i ∈ {1, ..., N} ∣∣∣ λi(t) > 0}. (18)
If the set Iλ(t) is empty, then there is no control on any agent: αi(t) = 0 for every i.
If the set I+λ (t) is not empty, then there exists i ∈ I+λ (t) such that αi(t) > 0. Furthermore,
∑
j αj ≥
min(|I+λ (t)|,M).
Proof. According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle (12), if the control α is optimal, then it minimizes the
Hamiltonian H (11) for almost all t ∈ [0, T ]. The only controllable part of H is H˜ = −ξ¯∑i αiλi. Minimizing
H requires controlling the largest positive λi with the maximum strength allowed, while setting αi = 0 if
λi < 0. If λi = 0, Pontryagin’s maximum principle gives no information on αi.
This leads to a trichotomy of cases.
• The biggest positive λi’s are always controlled with maximum control:
∑
i∈I+λ αi = min(|I
+
λ |,M).
• If for i, j, λi and λj coincide (at a certain time, which implies at all time) then αi and αj are under-
determined. The PMP only requests that αi + αj = c where c is given by the strength of the control
to be used on the two agents.
• The negative λi’s are never controlled: if λi < 0, then αi = 0.
Remark 3.4. The existence of an optimal control for the problem described above is ensured by the convexity
of the sets F (t, ξ) = {(ξi + (1− αi)ξ¯)i=1...N , α ∈ [0, 1]N , ∑i αi ≤M} (see [5]).
4 Final cost with two agents
For a clearer understanding of the mechanisms taking place, we consider the simple case of two agents in
Rd. We consider the sets of controls UM , where 0 < M ≤ 2. Thus, system (6) becomes:{
ξ˙1 = −ξ1 + (1− α1) ξ¯
ξ˙2 = −ξ2 + (1− α2) ξ¯.
(19)
Computing the difference of the two projected variables will also prove useful:
ξ˙1 − ξ˙2 = −(ξ1 − ξ2)− (α1 − α2)ξ¯. (20)
Three different situations may arise, depending on the value of the constraint on the control. Indeed, two
constraints are set: α1 +α2 ≤M , and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2. We differentiate the cases (a) 0 < M ≤ 1, (b)
1 < M < 2 and (c) M = 2.
4.1 Pontryagin’s Maximum Principal
Notice that the migration functional can be written as:
V =
1
2
(ξ21 + ξ
2
2) =
1
4
(
(ξ1 + ξ2)
2 + (ξ1 − ξ2)2
)
= ξ¯2 +
(
ξ1 − ξ2
2
)2
, (21)
once again emphasizing the necessary trade-off between two terms: the mean velocity ξ¯ and the distance
between the agents |ξ1 − ξ2|. Computing the Hamiltonian of the system gives:
H(t, ξ, λ, α) = −ξ¯ (α1λ1 + α2λ2) + ξ2 − ξ1
2
(λ1 − λ2). (22)
In line with Hyp. 2, two cases are possible: ξ1(0) = ξ2(0) or ξ1(0) > ξ2(0). The following proposition
deals with the first case.
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Proposition 4.1. If ξ1(0) = ξ2(0), then a control strategy α is optimal if and only if it satisfies α1 +α2 ≡M
and ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ).
Proof. Consider the control given by α˜1 ≡ α˜2 ≡ M2 . It achieves [ 12 (ξ1(T ) − ξ2(T ))]2 = 0 and ensures the
maximal decrease of ξ¯2, thus is optimal for the minimization of V(T ) (21). Still from (21), a control α is
optimal if and only if it achieves [ 12 (ξ1(T )− ξ2(T ))]2 = 0, which is equivalent to ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ), and ensures
the maximal decrease of ξ¯2, which is equivalent to α1 + α2 ≡M .
Hence, the case ξ1(0) = ξ2(0) is fully understood. In the following, we will deal with more complex cases
by assuming:
Hypothesis 4. ξ1(0) > ξ2(0).
Before studying each case in detail, we give general considerations on the relation between the control α
and λ:
(a) If M ≤ 1, minimizing H (i.e. maximizing 〈λ, α〉) gives (see Fig.1a): (α1, α2) = (M, 0) if 0 < λ2 < λ1;
(α1, α2) = (M/2,M/2) if 0 < λ2 = λ1; (α1, α2) = (M, 0) if λ2 < 0 < λ1; (α1, α2) = (0, 0) if λ2 < 0 and
λ1 < 0.
(b) If 1 < M < 2, minimizing H gives (see Fig.1b): (α1, α2) = (1,M − 1) if 0 < λ2 < λ1; (α1, α2) =
(M/2,M/2) if 0 < λ2 = λ1; (α1, α2) = (1, 0) if λ2 < 0 < λ1; (α1, α2) = (0, 0) if λ2 < 0 and λ1 < 0.
(c) If M ≥ 2, minimizing H gives (see Fig.1c): (α1, α2) = (1, 1) if 0 < λ2 ≤ λ1; (α1, α2) = (1, 0) if
λ2 < 0 < λ1; (α1, α2) = (0, 0) if λ2 < 0 and λ1 < 0.
Notice that in all three cases, if λ1 = λ2, then the Pontryagin maximum principle does not give sufficient
information since any combination of α1 and α2 such that α1 +α2 = M minimizes the scalar product −〈λ, α〉
(see Figure 1).
(a) Case M ≤ 1 (b) Case 1 < M < 2 (c) Case M ≥ 2
Figure 1: Minimizing −〈λ, α〉
The dynamics for λ are given by λ˙ = −∇H =
(
1+α1
2 λ1 − 1−α22 λ2
1+α2
2 λ2 − 1−α12 λ1
)
, which allows us to compute the
evolution of the difference λ1 − λ2:
d
dt
(λ1 − λ2) = λ1 − λ2. (23)
The transversality conditions give: λ(T ) = ∇V(T ) = (ξ1(T ), ξ2(T ))T . Hence, if the final configuration is
such that ξ1(T ) 6= ξ2(T ), i.e. λ1(T ) 6= λ2(T ), the difference λ1 − λ2 increases with time. On the other
hand, if λ1(T ) = λ2(T ), then ∀t ≤ T, λ1(t) = λ2(t). If the dynamics allow us to drive ξ1 and ξ2 together
before time T , then λ1(t) = λ2(t) for all t, and the Pontryagin maximum principle does not give sufficient
information, as seen above.
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4.2 Global Strategy
According to equation (21), the functional V can be written as:
V = ξ¯2 +
(ξ1 − ξ2)2
4
. (24)
Minimizing V requires minimizing ξ¯ and (ξ1 − ξ2)2 simultaneously. The evolution of ξ¯ is given by:
˙¯ξ = −1
2
(α1 + α2) ξ¯, (25)
while that of (ξ1 − ξ2)2 is:
d
dt
(
(ξ1 − ξ2)2
)
= −2(ξ1 − ξ2)2 − 2(ξ1 − ξ2)ξ¯(α1 − α2). (26)
Thus, minimizing ξ¯2 (both instantaneously and globally) requires using full control, i.e. setting α1 +α2 = M .
On the other hand, the strategy to minimize (ξ1− ξ2)2 is less clear. It would require both maximizing ξ¯ and
maximizing the difference α1−α2 (assuming that ξ1−ξ2 ≥ 0), and these conditions might not be compatible.
4.3 Case M = 1
Theorem 4.2.
Let T > 0 and let M = 1. Furthermore, let α = (α1, α2) ∈ U1 (see (4)) be an optimal control and ξ be the
corresponding trajectory of system (19). Define t0 = 2 ln(ξ1(0)/ξ¯(0)). Then
(i) T ≥ t0 if and only if ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). In such a case, the control satisfies: α1 + α2 ≡ 1 (so ξ¯(t) =
ξ¯(0)e−t/2). For instance, the strategy (α1, α2)(t) = (1, 0) for all t ∈ [0, t0[ and (α1, α2)(t) = (1/2, 1/2)
for all t ∈ [t0, T ] is optimal.
(ii) If T < t0, then α(t) = (0, 0) for all t ∈ [0, t∗[ and α(t) = (1, 0) for all t ∈ [t∗, T ], where t∗ = 2 ln(X¯)
and X¯ ∈ [1, eT/2[ is defined as follows:
X¯ = arg min
X∈[1,eT/2]
[(
ξ1(0) + ξ¯(0)(X
2 − 1))2 + (ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)(X2 − 1) + 2ξ¯(0)X(eT/2 −X))2] .
Proof. Let ξ be an optimal trajectory achieved with optimal control α.
To prove (i), we shall show that the three statements (a) T ≥ t0, (b) there exists t ∈ [0, T ] such that
ξ1(t) = ξ2(t) and (c) ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) are equivalent.
Suppose (b) there exists τ ∈ [0, T ] such that ξ1(τ) = ξ2(τ). Then necessarily ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). Indeed, suppose
that ξ1(T ) 6= ξ2(T ). Then any strategy α˜ such that on [0, τ ], α˜ = α and on ]τ, T ], (α˜1, α˜2) = (α1+α22 , α1+α22 )
achieves: ¯˜ξ(T ) = ξ¯(T ) and (ξ˜1 − ξ˜2)2(T ) = 0 < (ξ1 − ξ2)(T ) (where ξ˜, V˜ denote the trajectory and cost
corresponding to α˜), so according to equation (24), V˜(T ) < V(T ) and control strategy α cannot be optimal.
Hence, ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ).
Now suppose (c) ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). The transversality condition (15) gives λ1(T ) = λ2(T ) and from Proposition
3.1 we get: λ1(t) = λ2(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, ˙¯λ =
∑
αiλi = (
∑
αi)λ¯. Since ξ¯(T ) > 0, the transversality
condition (15) gives: λ¯(T ) > 0, and λ¯(t) = λ1(t) = λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the set Iλ, see
(18), is not empty, so according to Proposition 3.3, the optimal control strategy requires using maximal
control strength: α1 + α2 ≡ 1. According to equation (25), this suffices to fully determine ξ¯(t) = ξ¯(0) e−t/2.
Then ξ1(t) − ξ2(t) = e−t
(
(ξ1 − ξ2)(0)− ξ¯(0)
∫ t
0
(α1 − α2)es/2ds
)
, and ξ1(t) − ξ2(t) = 0 if, and only if,∫ t
0
es/2(α1−α2)(s)ds = (ξ1(0)− ξ2(0))/ξ¯(0). Notice that min(α1,α2)∈U1{t | (ξ1− ξ2)(t) = 0} is obtained when
α1 − α2 is maximal, i.e. for (α1, α2) ≡ (1, 0). With this strategy, min(α1,α2)∈U1{t | (ξ1 − ξ2)(t) = 0} := t0 =
2 ln(ξ1(0)/ξ¯(0)). Hence, we must have: T ≥ t0.
Lastly, suppose (a) T ≥ t0. Design a strategy α˜ so that for all t < t0, (α˜1, α˜2) = (1, 0) and for all
t ≥ t0, (α˜1, α˜2) = (1/2, 1/2). This strategy is optimal since it maximizes the decrease of ¯˜ξ, see (25), and
achieves (ξ˜1 − ξ˜2)(T ) = 0, see (26). Hence, our optimal strategy α must also satisfy: ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) and
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α1 + α2 ≡ 1. This proves (b).
We showed that (a), (b) and (c) are equivalent. We thus proved the first part of the proposition: T ≥ t0 if
and only if ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). In this case, it also holds: α1 + α2 ≡ 1.
If on the other hand, (ii) T < t0, then ξ1(t) > ξ2(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] (since (b) implies (a)). According to
condition (15) and to Prop. 3.1, λ1(t) > λ2(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and λ1(T ) > 0. The evolution of λ1 is given
by: λ˙1 = 12 (α1λ1 + α2λ2) + λ1 − λ¯ > 0 since λ1 > λ¯. Hence, two cases must be distinguished: either λ1 > 0
at all time, so the set I+λ is non-empty and full control will be used at all time, or there exists t
∗ ∈]0, T [ such
that λ1 < 0 on [0, t∗[, λ1(t∗) = 0 and λ1 > 0 on ]t∗, T ], in which case α = (0, 0) on [0, t∗[ and α = (1, 0) on
]t∗, T ]. Knowing this, it is easy to express ξ1, ξ2 and V as functions of t∗:
∀t ∈ [t∗, T ],

ξ1(t) = e
−t(ξ1(0) + ξ¯(0)(et
∗ − 1))
ξ2(t) = e
−t(ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)(et
∗ − 1) + 2ξ¯(0)et∗/2(et/2 − et∗/2))
V(t) = ξ21(t) + ξ22(t)
. (27)
Denoting X = et
∗/2, V(T ) can be written as a biquadratic polynomial in X:
V(T )(X) = e−2T
[(
ξ1(0) + ξ¯(0)(X
2 − 1))2 + (ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)(X2 − 1) + 2ξ¯(0)X(eT/2 −X))2] .
We look for X¯ minimizing V(T )(X) in the interval [1, eT/2] (so that t∗ ∈ [0, T ]). Notice that the leading
term is 2e−2T ξ¯(0)2 ·X4. Hence, there are at most two local minima in the interval [1, eT/2]. Furthermore,
V(T )(1) = e−2T
[
ξ1(0)
2 + (ξ2(0) + 2ξ¯(0)(e
T/2 − 1))2] and V(T )(eT/2) = e−2T [(ξ1(0) + ξ¯(0)(eT/2 − 1))2 +
(ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)(e
T −1))2], so V(T )(1) < V(T )(eT/2), which means that X¯ < eT/2. If X¯ = 1, then t∗ = 0 so it is
optimal to act with control (1, 0) on the full interval [0, T ]. If 1 < X¯ < eT/2, then 0 < t∗ < T . The optimal
control strategy will require leaving the system to evolve without control on [0, t∗[, and acting with control
α = (1, 0) on [t∗, T ].
Remark 4.3. The existence of an initial "Inactivation" period can be proven also with any number of agents
(see Theorem 5.3). Numerical simulations with any number of agents (see Section 5.2) show that in some
cases it is indeed optimal to let the system evolve without control on an initial time interval [0, t∗], where
t∗ > 0.
4.4 Case M < 1
Generalizing to the case of any M < 1, we conduct the same analysis and the optimal control strategy is
similar.
Theorem 4.4. Let T>0 and M<1. Let α = (α1, α2) ∈ UM (see (4)) be an optimal control and ξ be the
corresponding trajectory of system (19). Define t0 = 22−M ln
(
2−M
2M (ξ1(0)− ξ2(0))/ξ¯(0) + 1
)
. Then
(i) T ≥ t0 if and only of ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). In this case, the control satisfies: α1 + α2 ≡ M (so ξ¯(t) =
ξ¯(0)e−Mt/2).
(ii) If T < t0, then there exists t∗ ∈ [0, T [ such that α(t) = (0, 0) for all t ∈ [0, t∗[ and α(t) = (1, 0) for all
t ∈ [t∗, T ].
Remark 4.5. To compute t∗ ∈ [0, T [ in the case T < t0, one can compute V(T )(et∗/2) depending on
t∗ ∈ [0, T ] similarly to the case M = 1.
Proof. Let ξ be an optimal trajectory achieved with optimal control α ∈ UM . We argue as in the caseM = 1.
To prove (i), first suppose that there exists τ ∈ [0, T ] such that ξ1(τ) = ξ2(τ). Then, as in the case M = 1,
necessarily it holds ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) and any strategy achieving ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) while using maximum control
α1 + α2 ≡ M is optimal. Then ξ1(t) − ξ2(t) = 0 ⇔
∫ t
0
e
2−M
2 s(α1 − α2)(s)ds = (ξ1(0) − ξ2(0))/ξ¯(0). Hence,
minα∈UM {t | (ξ1 − ξ2)(t) = 0} is obtained when α1 − α2 is maximal, i.e. for (α1, α2) ≡ (M, 0). With this
strategy, minα∈UM {t | (ξ1 − ξ2)(t) = 0} = t0 as defined above. Hence, if there exists τ ≤ T such that
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ξ1(τ) = ξ2(τ), then T ≥ t0. This proves the first implication of the proposition: if ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ), then
T ≥ t0.
Conversely, if T ≥ t0, then the strategy (α˜1, α˜2) = (M, 0) on [0, t0[ and (α˜1, α˜2) = (M2 , M2 ) on [t0, T ]
is optimal since it minimizes ¯˜ξ(T ) and achieves ξ˜1(T ) = ξ˜2(T ). Hence, if α is optimal, it must also satisfy
α1 + α2 ≡M and ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ), which proves the second implication.
Now assume (ii) T < t0. From (i) we get: ξ1(t) > ξ2(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. One can then argue as in the
case M = 1. According to Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, α2 ≡ 0 and two cases have to be distinguished:
either λ1 > 0 at all time, so the set I+λ (see (18)) is non-empty and full control will be used at all time, or
there exists t∗ ∈]0, T [ such that λ1 < 0 on [0, t∗[, λ1(t∗) = 0 and λ1 > 0 on ]t∗, T ], in which case α = (0, 0)
on [0, t∗[ and α = (M, 0) on ]t∗, T ].
Remark 4.6. Notice that in the limit case M → 1 of Theorem 4.4, one finds the same expression for t0 as
in Theorem 4.2.
4.5 Case M = 2
In order to determine the optimal strategy, let us first study the evolution of the covectors λ. From ξ1(T ) ≥
ξ¯(T ) > 0 (see Prop. 1.1 and Hyp. 3) and the transversality condition (15), we get λ1(T ) > 0.
Proposition 4.7. Let M = 2 and λ1 and λ2 be the covectors corresponding to an optimal control strategy
for the system (19). Then they satisfy the following properties:
(i) If λ2(T ) > 0, then λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) If λ2(T ) = 0, then λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(iii) If λ2(T ) < 0, then λ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof.
(i) Let λ2(T ) > 0. Suppose that there exists τ ∈ [0, T [ such that λ2(τ) = 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈]τ, T ].
Then since λ1 ≥ λ2 > 0 on ]τ, T ], according to Pontryagin’s maximum principle (see Section 4.1), (α1, α2) ≡
(1, 1) on ]τ, T ], which gives the following evolutions: λ˙1 = λ1 and λ˙2 = λ2. Hence, λ2(τ) = λ2(T )eτ−T > 0,
which contradicts the definition of τ . Therefore, λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and by (17), λ1(t) > 0 .
(ii) Let λ2(T ) = 0. Let τ := inf [0,T ]{t¯ ∈ [0, T ] s.t. λ2(t) = 0 for all t > t¯} and suppose that τ > 0. By
definition of τ , λ2(τ) = 0. Since λ1(t) > λ2(t) for all t (see Prop. 3.1), there exists an interval [τ − δ, τ [ on
which λ1 > 0 and either λ2 > 0 or λ2 < 0. If λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [τ − δ, τ [, then according to Pontryagin’s
maximum principle (Section 4.1), the control satisfies α1(t) = α2(t) = 1, which gives: λ˙2(t) = λ2(t) > 0. So
λ2(τ) > 0, which contradicts the definition of τ . If on the other hand λ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [τ − δ, τ [, then
α2(t) = 0 and λ˙2(t) = 12λ2(t) < 0, which is impossible since it implies λ2(τ) < 0. Hence, τ = 0. Furthermore,
since λ1(T ) > 0 and λ2 ≡ 0, then λ˙1 = λ1 in a neighborhood of T , which ensures that λ1(t) > 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ] (by the same reasoning as in (i)).
(iii) Let λ2(T ) < 0. Define τ := inf [0,T ]{t¯ ∈ [0, T ] s.t. λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) < 0 for all t > t¯}. Then on ]τ, T ],
as seen in Section 4.1, α1 ≡ 1 and α2 ≡ 0, which gives: λ2(t) = λ2(τ)eT−τ . Since λ2(T ) < 0, it follows
that λ2(τ) < 0. Hence, either τ = 0 or λ1(τ) = 0. Notice that since λ1(t) > λ2(t) for all t, λ1 is strictly
increasing (see (13)). Then the former case implies that λ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In the latter case, we
get that λ2(t) < 0 for all t ≤ τ .
This information about the covectors allows us to solve the optimization problem based on the initial
conditions and the final time. Recall from Proposition 1.1 that ξ1(0) > 0.
Theorem 4.8. Let M=2. Let (α1, α2) ∈ U2 be an optimal control strategy and ξ be the corresponding
trajectory for system (19). Define t0 = 2 ln
(
ξ1(0)/(2ξ¯(0))
)
.
(i) If ξ2(0) > 0, then (α1, α2) ≡ (1, 1).
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(ii) If ξ2(0) ≤ 0 and T ≥ t0, then ξ2(T ) = 0 and α1 ≡ 1. For instance the strategy (α1, α2) = (1, 0) for all
t ∈ [0, t0[ and (α1, α2) = (1, 1) for all t ∈ [t0, T ] is optimal. Furthermore, if there exists t¯ ∈ [0, T [ such
that ξ2(t¯) = 0, then ξ2(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [t¯, T ].
(iii) If ξ2(0) ≤ 0 and T < t0, then there exists t∗ ∈ [0, T [ such that α(t) = (0, 0) for all t ∈ [0, t∗[ and
α(t) = (1, 0) for all t ∈ [t∗, T ].
Proof. Let (α1, α2) be an optimal control strategy and ξ be the corresponding trajectory.
(i) Let ξ2(0) > 0. According to Prop. 1.1, for all t ∈ [0, T ] it holds ξ1(t) > 0 and ξ2(t) > 0. Then λ1(T ) > 0
and λ2(T ) > 0. From Prop. 4.7 it follows that λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. According to the
PMP (see Section 4.1), maximal control has to be used at all time, i.e. (α1, α2)(t) = (1, 1) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For cases (ii) and (iii), let ξ2(0) ≤ 0. By Prop. 1.1 it holds ξ1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Suppose that
ξ2(T ) > 0. Then from Prop. 4.7 we get λ1(t) ≥ λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], so (α1, α2) ≡ (1, 1). But with this
strategy ξ˙2 = −ξ2, so ξ2(t) = ξ2(0)e−t ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], which contradicts ξ2(T ) > 0. Hence ξ2(T ) ≤ 0.
(ii) First assume that T ≥ t0. Let us show that ξ2(T ) = 0 and α1 ≡ 1. Such a strategy exists, since for
instance the control (β1, β2)(t) = (1, 0) for t ∈ [0, t0[ and (β1, β2)(t) = (1, 1) for t ∈ [t0, T ] achieves ξβ2 (t) = 0
for all t ∈ [t0, T ] (where ξβ denotes the trajectory corresponding to the control strategy β) – by direct
computation of (19). Suppose that ξ2(T ) < 0. Then α cannot be optimal since the control strategy β achieves
the minimum of ξβ1 (T )
2, see (19), and of ξβ2 (T )
2 and therefore the minimum of V(T ) = ξβ1 (T )2 + ξ
β
2 (T )
2.
Hence α must satisfy α1 ≡ 1 and ξ2(T ) = 0 in order to perform as well as β. Obviously, all strategies that
achieve ξ2(T ) = 0 with α1 ≡ 1 achieve the same final positions (see (19)) and thus have the same V(T ).
Furthermore, if there exists a tˆ < T such that ξ2(tˆ) = 0, then ξ2(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [tˆ, T ]: if ξ2(t¯) = 0, then
ξ˙2(t¯) = (1 − α2)ξ¯(t¯) ≥ 0 and therefore ξ2 cannot become negative, once it reaches 0. On the other hand, if
ξ2(t) > 0, then ξ2(T ) > 0 by Prop. 1.1.
(iii) Assume now that T < t0. Firstly, we show that an optimal strategy (by PMP) always achieves
ξ2(T ) < 0. We argue by contradiction: Assume that ξ2(T ) = 0. Then λ1(T ) > 0 and λ2(T ) = 0 and,
according to Proposition 4.7, it follows that λ1(t) > λ2(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. According to the PMP,
α1 ≡ 1. Then the growth of ξ2 is maximal if, and only if, α2 ≡ 0 since in this case ξ¯ is maximal. But with
this strategy ξ2 cannot reach 0 before t0 – by direct computation of (19). Therefore ξ2(T ) < 0, so λ2(T ) < 0
and λ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] by Prop. 4.7. Hence we are in the same situation as in the case M = 1 and
M < 1. Two cases are possible: either λ1 > 0 at all time, so the set I+λ is non-empty and full control on ξ1
is used at all time, or there exists t∗ ∈]0, T [ such that λ1 < 0 on [0, t∗[, λ1(t∗) = 0 and λ1 > 0 on ]t∗, T ], in
which case α = (0, 0) on [0, t∗[ and α = (1, 0) on ]t∗, T ].
Remark 4.9. To compute t∗ ∈ [0, T [ in the case ξ1(0) > −ξ2(0) > 0 and T < t0, one can compute V(T )(X)
depending on t∗ ∈ [0, T [ similarly to the case M = 1.
4.6 Case 1 < M < 2
As in the case M = 2, we state the following properties concerning the covectors λ.
Proposition 4.10. LetM ∈]1, 2[ and λ1 and λ2 be the covectors corresponding to an optimal control strategy
for the system (19). They satisfy the following properties:
(i) If λ2(T ) > 0, then λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) If λ2(T ) = 0, then λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(iii) If λ2(T ) < 0, then λ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Prop 4.7.
(i) Let λ2(T ) > 0. Suppose that there exists τ ∈ [0, T [ such that λ2(τ) = 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ∈]τ, T ].
Then if λ1 > λ2 > 0 on ]τ, T ], according to Pontryagin’s maximum principle (see Section 4.1), (α1, α2) ≡
(1,M − 1) on ]τ, T ], which gives λ˙2 = M2 λ2. If λ1 = λ2 > 0 on ]τ, T ], then α1 + α2 ≡ M (see Figure 1b),
which also gives λ˙2 = M2 λ2. Hence, λ2(τ) = λ2(T )e
M
2 (τ−T ) > 0, which contradicts the definition of τ .
For (ii) and (iii) we reason the same way as in the proof of Proposition 4.7.
12
As in the previous sections, this allows us to solve the optimal control problem by distinguishing cases
based on the initial conditions and the final time. The case ξ2(0) < 0 is illustrated in Figure 2.
Theorem 4.11.
Let M ∈]1, 2[. Let α ∈ UM be an optimal control strategy and ξ be the corresponding trajectory.
Define t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 as: t0 = 2 ln
(
ξ1(0)
2ξ¯(0)
)
, t1 =
2
2−M ln
(
ξ1(0)
2ξ¯(0)
)
and t2 = 22−M ln(
ξ1(0)
ξ¯(0)
).
If ξ2(0) > 0, two subcases are to be distinguished:
• If T < t2, then (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1) and 0 < ξ2(T ) < ξ1(T ).
• If T ≥ t2, ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) and α1 + α2 = M .
In the case ξ2(0) < 0, four subcases appear:
• If T < t0, then ξ2(t) < 0 and there exists t∗ ∈ [0, T [ such that (α1, α2)(t) = (0, 0) for all t ∈ [0, t∗] and
(α1, α2)(t) = (1, 0) for all t ∈]t∗, T ].
• If t0 ≤ T ≤ t1, then α1 ≡ 1 and ξ2(T ) = 0.
• If t1 < T < t2, then (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1) and 0 < ξ2(T ) < ξ1(T ).
• If t2 ≤ T , then α1 + α2 ≡M and ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ).
Remark 4.12. Notice that if ξ1(0) = ξ2(0), then t2 = 0.
Remark 4.13. In the limit case M → 1, the times t0 and t1 are equal, which is in line with Theorem 4.2.
In the limit case M → 2, t1 and t2 are undefined, in line with Theorem 4.8.
(a) T < t0 (b) t0 ≤ T ≤ t1 (c) t1 < T < t2 (d) t2 ≤ T
Figure 2: Control strategies in the case ξ2(0) < 0 (controlled agents in red, uncontrolled ones in blue)
Proof. See appendix.
5 Final cost with any number of agents and control bounded by
M=1
5.1 Theroretical Analysis
In this section, we address the optimal control problem of minimizing V(T ) with any number of agents,
setting the upper bound M = 1 on the strength of the control, i.e.
∑N
i=1 αi ≤ 1. We define the set of such
controls:
U =
{
α : [0, T ]→ [0, 1]N
∣∣∣ α measurable, s.t. for all t ∈ [0, T ] N∑
i=1
αi(t) ≤ 1
}
. (28)
We remind the equations governing the evolution of ξi and ξ¯ for i ∈ {1, ..., N}:
ξ˙i = −ξi + (1− αi)ξ¯ and ˙¯ξ = −(
∑
i
αi) ξ¯. (29)
As before, we aim to minimize the migration functional V = 1N
N∑
i=1
ξ2i over the space U at final time:
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Problem 1. Find arg min
α∈U
V(T ).
Let us consider the restricted set of full-strength controls UFS ⊂ U :
UFS =
{
α : [0, T ]→ [0, 1]N
∣∣∣ α measurable, s.t. for all t, N∑
i=1
αi(t) = 1
}
. (30)
We also introduce the set of optimal controls Uopt:
Uopt =
{
α ∈ U s.t. Vα = min
β∈U
Vβ
}
. (31)
A question then arises naturally: are there optimal controls among full-strength controls? In other words,
we study the intersection UFS ∩ Uopt. To answer this, we first look for an optimal control strategy among
the restricted set of controls UFS, i.e. we consider the problem:
Problem 2. Find arg min
α∈UFS
V(T ).
Introducing the partial mean ξ¯1,l = 1l
∑l
i=1 ξi, we design the following optimal control strategy to solve
Problem 2.
Theorem 5.1 (Full-control strategy).
Let T > 0. The strategy designed in Prop 2.1 to decrease V˙ instantaneously is an optimal control strategy
for Problem 2. It can be explicitly described as follows:
Define t1 = 0 and for l ∈ {2, ..., N}, tl = NN−1 ln
(
(l − 1)N−1N ξ¯1,l−1(0)−ξl(0)ξ¯(0) + 1
)
.
If there exists l ∈ {1, ..., N−1} such that T ∈ [tl, tl+1[, then any strategy satisfying: ξi(T ) = ξ¯1,l(T ) for every
i ∈ {1, ..., l}, ∑li=1 αi ≡ 1 and αi ≡ 0 for every i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N} is optimal.
If T ≥ tN , then any strategy satisfying ξi(T ) = ξ¯(T ) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N} and
∑N
i=1 αi ≡ 1 is optimal.
For instance, if T ∈ [tl, tl+1[, one optimal strategy would consist in defining the following piecewise constant
control:
∀k ≤ l, ∀t ∈ [tk, tk+1[,
{
αi(t) =
1
k if i ≤ k
αi(t) = 0 if i > k.
(32)
Proof. Let us first show that if T ≥ tl, then the optimal control strategy for Problem 2 must achieve
ξi(T ) = ξ¯1,l(T ) for all i ∈ {1, ..., l}, reasoning by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists k ∈ {1, ..., l} such that ξk(T ) 6= ξ¯1,l(T ). Using Hyp. 3, we can suppose that
there exists m < l such that for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}, ξi(T ) = ξ¯1,m(T ), and for every i ∈ {1, ...,m} and
j ∈ {m+ 1, ..., N}, ξj(T ) < ξi(T ).
Let j ∈ {m + 1, ..., l}. The transversality condition (15) gives: for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}, λj(T ) < λi(T ).
According to Proposition 3.1, for all t ∈ [0, T ], for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}, λj(t) < λi(t). According to the PMP,
as seen in Section 3, only the biggest covectors are controlled, and since α ∈ UFS, with maximum control.
So
∑m
i=1 αi ≡ 1 and αj ≡ 0. The evolutions of ξj and ξ¯1,m are then given by:{
ξ˙j = −ξj + ξ¯
˙¯ξ1,m = −ξ¯1,m + m−1m ξ¯.
(33)
Since
∑N
i=1 αi ≡ 1, the evolution of the mean is given by ˙¯ξ = − 1N ξ¯, and we can compute ξ¯ = ξ¯(0)e−t/N ,
which in turn allows us to solve:
∀t ∈ [0, T ],
ξj(t) = e
−t
(
ξj(0) +
N
N−1 ξ¯(0)(e
N−1
N t − 1)
)
ξ¯1,m(t) = e
−t
(
ξ¯1,m(0) +
m−1
m
N
N−1 ξ¯(0)(e
N−1
N t − 1)
)
.
(34)
We get:
(ξ¯1,m − ξj)(T ) = e−T
(
ξ¯1,m(0)− ξj(0)− 1
m
N
N − 1 ξ¯(0)(e
N−1
N T − 1)
)
. (35)
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We made the hypothesis that T ≥ tl = NN−1 ln
(
(l − 1)N−1N ξ¯1,l−1(0)−ξl(0)ξ¯(0) + 1
)
. Hence,
(ξ¯1,m − ξj)(T ) ≤ e−T
(
ξ¯1,m(0)− ξj(0)− 1
m
(l − 1)(ξ¯1,l−1(0)− ξl(0))
)
=
1
m
e−T
[
mξ¯1,m(0)−mξj(0)− (l − 1)ξ¯1,l−1(0) + (l − 1)ξl(0)
]
(∗)
≤ 1
m
e−T
[
m∑
i=1
ξi(0)−
l−1∑
i=1
ξi(0) + (l − 1−m)ξl(0)
]
=
1
m
e−T
[
−
l−1∑
i=m+1
ξi(0) + (l − 1−m)ξl(0)
]
(∗)
≤ 1
m
e−T [−(l − 1−m)ξl(0) + (l − 1−m)ξl(0)]
= 0,
(36)
where inequalities (∗) derive from Hypothesis 2: since j ≤ l, ξj(0) ≥ ξl(0). However, (ξ¯1,m − ξj)(T ) ≤ 0
contradicts that ξj(T ) < ξi(T ) for every i ∈ {1, ...,m}. From this we conclude that if T ≥ tl, then for every
i ∈ {1, ..., l}, ξi(T ) = ξ¯1,l(T ) for an optimal control strategy fulfilling Hypothesis 3.
Let us now show that if T < tl+1, then for every k ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}, αi ≡ 0 and ξk(T ) < ξ¯1,l(T ).
ξ¯1,l(T )− ξk(T ) (1)= e−T
ξ¯1,l(0)− ξk(0)− ∫ T
0
e
N−1
N s(
1
l
l∑
j=1
αj − αk)(s)ξ¯(0)ds

(2)
≥ e−T
(
ξ¯1,l(0)− ξk(0)−
∫ T
0
e
N−1
N s
1
l
ξ¯(0)ds
)
= e−T
(
ξ¯1,l(0)− ξk(0)− N
N − 1
1
l
ξ¯(0)(e
N−1
N T − 1)
)
(3)
> e−T
(
ξ¯1,l(0)− ξk(0)− (ξ¯1,l(0)− ξl+1(0))
)
= e−T (ξl+1(0)− ξk(0))
(4)
≥ 0,
(37)
where:
(1) was computed using the evolutions of ξk and ξ¯1,l: ξ˙k = −ξk+(1−αk)ξ¯ and ˙¯ξ1,l = −ξ¯1,l+(1− 1l
∑l
i=1 αi)ξ¯,
(2) was obtained from inequalities
∑l
j=1 αj(t) ≤ 1 and αk(t) ≥ 0 for all t,
(3) comes from the inequality: T < tl+1 = NN−1 ln(
N−1
N l
ξ¯1,l(0)−ξl+1(0)
ξ¯(0)
+ 1),
(4) derives from Hypothesis 2 since k ≥ l + 1.
Hence, for every k ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}, ξk(T ) ≥ ξ¯1,l(T ). Furthermore, the transversality condition (15) and
Proposition 3.1 imply that for all t ∈ [0, T ] for every i ∈ {1, ..., l}, λk(t) < λi(t) and the Pontryagin
Maximum Principle as seen in Section 3 states that αk ≡ 0. So ξk(T ) ≥ ξ¯1,l(T ).
We proved that if T ∈ [tl, tl+1[, then for every i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}, αi ≡ 0. Since ξ¯ is fully determined as
α ∈ UFS, this means that for all i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}, ξi(T ) is also fully determined (satisfying the equation
ξ˙i = −ξi+ ξ¯ ). On the other hand, we proved that for all i ∈ {1, ..., l}, ξi(T ) = ξ¯1,l(T ) and that
∑l
i=1 αi ≡ 1,
so ξ¯1,l is also fully determined (satisfying the equation ˙¯ξ1,l = −ξ¯1,l + l−1l ξ¯ ). Hence, any strategy such that
for all i ∈ {1, ..., l}, ξi(T ) = ξ1,l(T ) with
∑l
i=1 αi ≡ 1 and for all i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}, αi ≡ 0 is optimal for
Problem 2.
Notice that this optimal control strategy is not sparse, as control is split among more and more agents
as time goes. However, it is not unique and one could very well act on one agent at a time until all reach
the known final velocities. Going back to the general Problem 1, we prove that under certain conditions, the
optimal control strategy uses full strength at all time, i.e. αopt ∈ UFS .
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Theorem 5.2 (Sufficient condition for full control).
Define the time tN = NN−1 ln
(
(N−1)2
N
ξ¯1,N−1(0)−ξN (0)
ξ¯(0)
+ 1
)
as in Theorem 5.1.
If T ≥ tN , then the optimal strategies αopt to Problem 1 belong to UFS and for these controls ξi(T ) = ξ¯(T )
for every i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proof. If T ≥ tN , then the instantaneous decrease strategy designed in Theorem 5.1 is optimal. Indeed, we
noticed that the migration functional can be written as the sum of two terms (10): V = ξ¯2 + 1N
∑
(ξi − ξ¯)2.
The strategy designed in Theorem 5.1 minimizes ξ¯(T ) by using full control at all time, hence minimizing
ξ¯(T )2 since ξ¯ > 0. Furthermore, it achieves ξi(T ) = ξ¯(T ) for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}, thus minimizing the second
term 1N
∑
(ξi − ξ¯)2. Hence any optimal control strategy has to use full control at all time and achieve
ξi(T ) = ξ¯(T ) for every i ∈ {1, ..., N} in order to perform as well.
We finally address the general case stated in Problem 1: minimize V(T ) over the set of controls U , for a
given final time T . In the following theorem, we show the existence of an initial "Inactivation" time interval:
the optimal strategy can require to let the system evolve freely (i.e. without control) at initial time, before
acting on it with full strength.
Theorem 5.3 (Inactivation Principle).
If T < tN , then one of the two holds: any control strategy αopt either belongs to UFS and the strategy designed
in Theorem 5.1 is optimal, or there exists some δ < T such that αopt ≡ 0 on [0, δ], and ∑αopti ≡ 1 on [δ, T ].
Proof. According to Hypothesis 3, we can assume that ξ1(T ) ≥ ξi(T ) for every i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Furthermore,
ξ¯(T ) > 0, so ξ1(T ) > 0. From the transversality condition (15) we deduce: λ1(T ) ≥ λi(T ) for every
i ∈ {1, ..., N} and λ1(T ) > 0. From Prop. 3.1, we know that for all t ∈ [0, T ], λ1(t) ≥ λi(t). According
to Prop. 3.3, full control is used at time t if λ1(t) > 0 and no control is used if λ1(t) < 0. Let us study
the evolution of λ1: λ˙1 = 1N
∑
αjλj − λ¯ + λ1. By the Pontryagin maximum principle, we always have∑
αjλj ≥ 0. Furthermore, λ1 − λ¯ ≥ 0. So λ˙1(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. We show that λ1 = 0 at most at
one point. Indeed, suppose that λ1(τ) = 0 for some τ ∈ [0, T ] and that λ˙1(τ) = 0. Then λ˙1(τ) = −λ¯(τ)
so λ¯(τ) = λ1(τ) = 0, and since the λi’s are ordered, λi(τ) = λ¯(τ) for every i ∈ {1, ..., N}. According
to Proposition 3.1, λi(t) = λ¯(t) for all time t and every i. Since λ1(T ) > 0, there exists a time interval
[τ∗, T ] such that λ1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [τ∗, T ]. On this interval, λ˙1 = 1N λ1
∑
j αj =
1
N λ1, which gives:
λ1(T ) = λ1(τ
∗)e
1
N (T−τ∗). This contradicts the existence of a time τ at which λ1(τ) = 0. In conclusion, if
λ1(τ) = 0, then λ˙1(τ) > 0 so λ1 = 0 at most at one point.
Hence, there is a dichotomy of cases:
Either λ1(t) ≥ 0 for all time, so I(t) 6= ∅ for all t, which implies that αopt ∈ UFS according to Prop. 3.3. In
this case, arg maxα∈U V = arg maxα∈UFS V and the control strategy designed in Theorem 5.1 for Problem 2
is optimal also for Problem 1.
Or there exists δ ∈ [0, T ] such that λ1(t) < 0 on [0, δ[ and λ1(t) ≥ 0 on [δ, T ], which implies that α(t) ≡
0 on [0, δ] and
∑
αi(t) ≡ 1 on ]δ, T ]. Practically, an optimal control strategy would consist in letting the
system evolve without control on [0, δ[. Then the full-control strategy from Theorem 5.1 can be applied on
[δ, T ] with the new initial positions ξ(δ).
Remark 5.4. Although this result may seem counter-intuitive, in certain cases it makes sense to let the
system evolve freely, at least initially. Indeed, without control the system naturally regroups in order to reach
consensus, minimizing
∑N
i=1(ξi− ξ¯) in (10), but keeping ξ¯ constant. Actual examples of such cases are shown
in the next section.
Remark 5.5. Note that a constraint M < 1 would not change the nature of the results. It would only mean
acting with less strength on the controlled agents, therefore changing the values of the times tl defined in
Theorem 5.1, but the optimal control strategy would be unchanged. With a constraint M > 1, we can expect
results similar to those of Section 4, with two kinds of Inactivation periods, consisting either in letting the
system evolve freely, or in controlling it with a non-maximal total strength 0 <
∑
i αi < M (see Theorem 4.8
(ii) and (iii)).
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5.2 Practical Approach
We proved in the previous section that the optimal strategy can either be to act with full control as in
Theorem 5.1, or to let the system evolve without control on some time interval [0, δ], before acting with full
control on ]δ, T ]. In this section, we explore the practicality of Inactivation strategies.
First, we run numerical simulations to find cases in which the optimal strategy involves Inactivation. The
migration functional Vδ can be computed explicitly as a function of δ. We then look for the value of δ that
minimizes Vδ(T ). Let us denote by ξδ the solution to system (29) when no control is applied on [0, δ] and
full control is used on ]δ, T ]. Equation (29) gives:{
ξ˙δi = −ξδi + ξ¯δ
˙¯ξδ = 0
on [0, δ], (38)
which allows us to solve: ξδi (δ) = e−δ
(
ξδi (0) + ξ¯
δ(0)(eδ − 1)). We then apply the strategy designed in
Theorem 5.1 with the new initial conditions ξδ(δ) and the new final time T − δ. Define the times tδ1 = 0 and
for l ∈ {2, ..., N}, tδl = NN−1 ln
(
(l − 1)N−1N
ξ¯δ1,l−1(δ)−ξδl (δ)
ξ¯δ(δ)
+ 1
)
. Find l ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, such that T − δ ∈
[tδl , t
δ
l+1[. Then any strategy satisfying ξ
δ
i (T ) = ξ¯
δ
1,l(T ) for every i ∈ {1, ..., l},
∑l
i=1 αi(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [δ, T ],
and αi ≡ 0 for every i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N} is optimal. From equation (29) we get:
˙¯ξδ1,l = −ξ¯δ1,l + l−1l ξ¯δ
ξ˙δi = −ξδi + ξ¯δ for i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}
˙¯ξδ = − 1N ξ¯δ
on [δ, T ], (39)
from which we can solve:ξ
δ
i (T ) = ξ¯
δ
1,l(T ) = e
−(T−δ)
(
ξ¯δ1,l(δ) +
l−1
l
N
N−1 ξ¯
δ(0)(e
N−1
N (T−δ) − 1)
)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., l},
ξδi (T ) = e
−(T−δ)
(
ξδi (δ) +
N
N−1 ξ¯
δ(0)(e
N−1
N (T−δ) − 1)
)
for all i ∈ {l + 1, ..., N}.
(40)
We can now compute Vδ(T ) = 1N
N∑
i=1
ξδi (T )
2 and numerically look for min
δ∈[0,T ]
Vδ(T ) (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: V δ(T ) with respect to Inactivation time δ. Here the optimal Inactivation time is δ = 1.94.
Series of simulations were run to look for cases in which δ > 0. Table 1 lists the percentage of such
cases found over 1000 simulations, for different values of the number of agents and of the final time. Initial
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projected variables ξi(0) were chosen randomly in the interval [−1, 1] and such that the mean ξ¯ is strictly
positive. As expected (and proven in Theorem 5.2), for larger values of T , it is always optimal to act with
full control at all time (in other words δ = 0). One also notices that as the number of agents increases,
"Inactivation" cases become less and less frequent.
Number of agents 5 10 20 50
T=3 1.6 % 0.9 % 0 0
T=4 1.8 % 0.7 % 0.3 % 0
T=5 1.0 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0
T=6 0.2 % 0.1 % 0 0.1 %
T=7 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Percentage of cases in which δ > 0 out of 1000 simulations. ξi(0) chosen randomly in [−1, 1].
Table 2 shows the average of the relative difference Vfc−V
δ
Vfc , where V
δ was obtained by using optimal
control and Vfc by using full control at all time (as designed in Theorem 5.1). The gain in performance when
using the optimal strategy is minor (significantly less than 1% in most cases), and decreases as the number
of agents increases.
Number of agents 5 10 20 50
T=3 0.073% 0.001% - -
T=4 0.27% 0.018% 0.001% -
T=5 0.91% 0.056% 0.0069% -
T=6 1.53% 0.2% - 0.00003 %
Table 2: Average relative improvement of Vδ w.r.t. Vfc
The occurrence of Inactivation cases can be explained by looking at the two terms in the migration
functional V = ξ¯2 + 1N
∑
(ξi − ξ¯)2 (10). When ξ¯2 is small, the control strategy should concentrate on
minimizing the second term 1N
∑
(ξi − ξ¯)2, which does not necessarily require full control since the system
naturally evolves to minimize this term. To confirm this reasoning, we look at the ratio R := ( 1N
∑
(ξi −
ξ¯)2)/ξ¯2 in one set of simulations (N = 5, T = 3) and find that the Inactivation cases correspond exactly to
the largest values of R. Furthermore, the larger the ratio, the longer the Inactivation interval (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Ratio R := ( 1N
∑
(ξi − ξ¯)2)/ξ¯2 as a function of the length of the Inactivation interval δ, for 20
simulations involving Inactivation with N = 5 and T = 3. The Inactivation δ increases as ξ¯2 tends to zero.
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Hence, Uopt ∩UFS = ∅ occurs in very few cases, namely those in which ξ¯2  1N
∑
(ξi− ξ¯)2. Furthermore,
when Inactivation exists, the gain in performance compared to the full control strategy is very minor. For
reasons of computational speed and complexity, it is very reasonable to neglect those cases and to apply the
full control strategy at all time.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the projected velocities ξi, i ∈ {1, ..., 10} with respect to time, in a case
where the optimal strategy requires full control at all time, with T > t10. The control function is the one
designed in Theorem 5.1 and acts first on ξ1, then on ξ1 and ξ2, and so on until all have reached consensus
(in terms of the projected velocities ξi), at which point it acts with equal strength on all agents to drive ξ¯
down to 0.
Figure 5: Evolution of the projected velocities ξi with the full strength optimal control for a system of 10
agents. In this example ξ¯(0) = 0.25 so full control at all time is needed to drive ξ¯ to the desired velocity
V = 0 (i.e. δ = 0). At final time T = 4.5 the system has reached consensus, but not yet at the desired
velocity.
6 Optimal control for integral cost
In this section we focus on minimizing the integral of the migration functional, with the constraint on the
controls M = 1. As done in Section 5, we define two problems (where U (28) and UFS (30) are defined as
before).
Problem 3. Find arg min
α∈U
∫ T
0
V(t)dt.
Problem 4. Find arg min
α∈UFS
∫ T
0
V(t)dt.
6.1 Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle
We first prove general results, with the aim of solving Problem 3. In order to use Pontryagin’s maximum
principle, we introduce the new Hamiltonian H = 〈λ, f〉 + λ0V and the equations governing the covectors’
evolution λ˙i = −∂H∂ξi . Considering normal trajectories, we set λ0 = 1 and obtain:H =
N∑
i=1
(−λiξi) + ξ¯
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)λi +
N∑
i=1
ξ2i
λ˙i = λi − 1N
∑
j(1− αj)λj − 2ξi.
(41)
19
Since the final condition is not fixed, we have the following transversality condition for the covectors:
λ(T ) = 0. (42)
As in the minimization of the migration functional at final time (Section 3), we define Iλ and I+λ (see (18)).
Then minimizing H =
∑N
i=1−αiλi + H˜ (where H˜ contains only uncontrolled terms) requires the following :
if k 6∈ Iλ, αk = 0; furthermore, if I+λ 6= ∅, then
∑
i∈I+λ αi = 1.
As in Section 5, we make Hypothesis 2. Given the initial order on the agents’ projected velocities ξi, we
prove the following:
Lemma 6.1. There exists an optimal control strategy satisfying:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i < j ⇒ ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t). (43)
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 3.2. Consider an optimal control strategy α ∈ U .
Define τ = sup{t | ∃β ∈ U s.t. ∫ T
0
Vβ(s)ds =
∫ T
0
Vα(s)ds and ξβ satisfies (43) on [0, t]}. Let us prove by
contradiction that τ = T . Suppose that τ < T . Then there exist i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} with i < j such that
ξβi (τ) = ξ
β
j (τ) and ξ
β
j (t) > ξ
β
i (t) on ]τ, τ + δ] for some δ > 0. Design a control strategy β˜ such that on
[τ, T ], β˜i = βj , β˜j = βi and for every k ∈ {1, ..., N} \ {i, j}, β˜k = βk. Then for all t ∈ [τ, T ], ξβ˜i (t) = ξβj (t),
and ξβ˜j (t) = ξ
β
i (t). So for all t ∈ [τ, τ + δ], ξβ˜i (t) ≥ ξβ˜j (t) and for all t ∈ [0, T ], Vβ˜(t) = Vβ(t). Proceeding
likewise for every pair of indices (m,n) satisfying m < n and ξβn(t) > ξβn(t) on ]τ, τ+δ] we are able to design a
control strategy β˜ satisfying (43) on [0, τ + δ] and
∫ T
0
Vβ(t)dt =
∫ T
0
Vα(t)dt, which contradicts the definition
of τ . In conclusion, τ = T , i.e. for all t ∈ [0, T ], for every i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, i < j ⇒ ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t).
Hence, as in Section 5, we can assume Hypothesis 3: for all t ∈ [0, T ], if i < j, then ξi(t) ≥ ξj(t). By the
following proposition, we shall prove that the same order is observed among the covectors λi.
Proposition 6.2.
∀t ∈ [0, T ], i < j ⇒ λi(t) ≥ λj(t). (44)
Proof. Let us reason by contradiction. Suppose that there exists τ ∈ [0, T ] such that for some i<j,
(λi − λj)(τ) < 0. From the evolution of the covectors (41) we derive for all t ≥ τ : (λi − λj)(t) =
et−τ
(
(λi − λj)(τ)− 2
∫ t
τ
e−(s−τ)(ξi − ξj)(s)ds
)
. Since (λi−λj)(τ) < 0 and for all s ∈ [0, T ], (ξi−ξj)(s) ≥ 0,
we deduce that for all t ∈ [τ, T ], (λi − λj)(t) < 0, which contradicts the final condition (42).
Proposition 6.3. Let τ ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, such that (λi − λj)(τ) = 0. Then for all t ≥ τ ,
(λi − λj)(t) = 0 and (ξi − ξj)(t) = 0.
Proof. Let τ ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, such that (λi − λj)(τ) = 0. Then for all t ≥ τ ,
(λi − λj)(t) = −2et−τ
∫ t
τ
e−(s−τ)(ξi − ξj)(s)ds. (45)
Suppose for instance that i < j. According to Proposition 6.2, for all t ∈ [0, T ], (λi − λj)(t) ≥ 0. Since we
made Hypothesis 3, the right-hand side of equation (45) is nonpositive. This is only possible if both sides
are equally zero. Hence, for all t ≥ τ , (λi − λj)(t) = 0 and (ξi − ξj)(t) = 0.
The following proposition states that if at a certain point in time, two agents have the same projected
velocities, then these should stay identical until final time.
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that there exists τ ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} such that ξi(τ) = ξj(τ). Then
for all t ≥ τ, ξi(t) = ξj(t). (46)
As a consequence, for almost all t ≥ τ , αi(t) = αj(t).
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Proof. Let τ ∈ [0, T ] and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Define τ˜ = sup{t ≥ τ | ξi(t) = ξj(t) for all t ∈ [τ, τ˜ ]}. Notice from
(29) that this implies that αi(t) = αj(t) for almost every t ∈ [τ, τ˜ ]. Let us prove that τ˜ = T .
Suppose that τ˜ < T . Then there exists δ > 0 such that for all t ∈]τ˜ , τ˜ + δ], ξi(t) 6= ξj(t). Define β such that
β = α on [0, τ˜ ] and {
βi = βj =
1
2 (αi + αj)
βk = αk for k 6= i, k 6= j
on ]τ˜ , T ],
and denote by ξβ the corresponding trajectory. Notice that
∑
k αk ≡
∑
k βk, so according to (29), ξ¯ ≡ ξ¯β .
This implies that ξk = ξ
β
k for all k 6= i, j. Moreover, αi + αj ≡ βi + βj so for all t ∈ [τ˜ , T ], (ξi + ξj)(t) =
(ξβi + ξ
β
j )(t). Furthermore, ξ
β
i and ξ
β
j satisfy the same differential equation on [τ˜ , T ] and ξ
β
i (τ) = ξ
β
j (τ), so
for all t ∈ [τ˜ , T ], ξβi (t) = ξβj (t) = 12 (ξi+ξj)(t). Define Vα and Vβ as the cost functions associated respectively
with the controls α and β. Then Vβ = Vα on [0, τ˜ ]. On ]τ˜ , T ],
Vα − Vβ =
∑
k
(ξk)
2 −
∑
k
(ξβk )
2 = (ξi)
2 + (ξj)
2 − (ξβi )2 − (ξβj )2
= (ξi)
2 + (ξj)
2 − 2(1
2
(ξi + ξj))
2 = (ξi − ξj)2.
Hence, for all t ∈]τ˜ , τ˜ + δ], Vα(t) > Vβ(t), and for all t ∈ [τ˜ + δ, T ], Vα(t) ≥ Vβ(t). We get
∫ T
0
Vβ <
∫ T
0
Vα,
which contradicts that α is an optimal control. In conclusion, τ = T , which proves the proposition.
6.2 Optimal full-strength control
We design an optimal control strategy for Problem 4:
Theorem 6.5. Let J(t) = {i ∈ {1, ..., N} | ξi(t) = maxj ξj(t)}. The following control α is optimal for
Problem 4: {
∀i ∈ J(t), αi(t) = 1|J(t)|
∀i 6∈ J(t), αi(t) = 0.
(47)
Proof. According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle and the expression of the Hamiltonian (41), the optimal
control strategy solving Problem 4 requires to set
∑
i∈I(t) αi(t) = 1 and αk(t) = 0 for k 6∈ I(t), where
I(t) := {i | λi(t) = maxj λj(t)}. Furthermore, according to Proposition 6.3, if λi(t¯) = λj(t¯), then ξi(t) = ξj(t)
for all t ≥ t¯, and according to Proposition 6.4, αi(t) = αj(t) for almost every t ≥ t¯. Hence, the optimal
strategy in fact requires to set, for almost every t ∈ [0, T ],{
∀i ∈ I(t), αi(t) = 1|I(t)|
∀i 6∈ I(t), αi(t) = 0,
(48)
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Let us prove that I(t) = J(t) for almost every t. Assume that
i ∈ I(t) and (48) holds true. According to Proposition 6.2, the covectors are ordered, so λ1(t) = · · · = λi(t).
From Proposition 6.3 and Hypothesis 3, this implies ξ1(t) = · · · = ξi(t), so i ∈ J(t). Conversely, assume that
i ∈ J(t). Then from Hypothesis 3, ξ1(t) = · · · = ξi(t). According to Proposition 6.4, α1(t) = · · · = αi(t).
Since α(t) verifies (48), we deduce that i ∈ I(t). Therefore, I(t) = J(t) for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] and the
optimal strategies (48) and (47) are equivalent.
Notice that the control strategy in the case of integral cost minimization with full control (Problem 4) is
equivalent to the Instantaneous decrease strategy of Prop. 2.1 (taking M = 1). It is more restrictive than
the optimal strategy minimizing the final value of the migration functional with full control (Problem 2)
seen in Section 5. Indeed, this control strategy cannot be sparse. In order to minimize
∫ T
0
V(t)dt, one has
to split the control among more and more agents. However, any optimal control solving Problem 4 is also
optimal for Problem 2.
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6.3 Optimal control in the general case
After designing the optimal strategy for Problem 4, we show that Problems 3 and 4 are actually equivalent,
i.e. that the optimal control solving Problem 3 belongs to UFS.
Theorem 6.6. The optimal control strategy for Problem 3 requires using full-strength control, i.e. α ∈ UFS.
Proof. According to the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (see Section 6.1), if λ1(t) > 0 for all t, then full
control must be used at all time. Combining the final condition (42) and the evolution (41), we get λ1(T ) = 0
and λ˙1(T ) = −2ξ1(T ) < 0. Hence there exists an interval ]t, T [ on which λ1 > 0. Let τ = inf{t ∈
[0, T ] s.t. λ1(s) > 0 for all s ∈]t, T [}. Suppose that τ > 0. Then λ1(τ) = 0. Furthermore, λ˙1(τ) =
(λ1 − λ¯)(τ) − 2ξ1(τ). We compute: λ˙1 − ˙¯λ = λ1 − λ¯ − 2(ξ1 − ξ¯). Denoting Λ = λ1 − λ¯, we get the
following evolution backwards in time: Λ˙ = −Λ + 2(ξ1 − ξ¯). Recall that backwards in time, we also have:
ξ˙1 = ξ1 − (1 − α1)ξ¯. If Λ = ξ1, then Λ˙ = ξ1 − 2ξ¯ = ξ˙1 + (1 − α1)ξ¯ − 2ξ¯ = ξ˙1 − (1 + α1)ξ¯ < ξ˙1. Since
Λ(T ) = 0 < ξ1(T ), this implies that Λ(t) < ξ1(t) for all t ∈ [τ, T ]. Hence, λ˙1(τ) = Λ(τ)− 2ξ1(τ) < 0, which
contradicts the definition of τ . We conclude that λ1(t) > 0 for all t ∈]0, T [, and that
∑
i αi ≡ 1.
Hence, the control strategy designed in Theorem 6.5 is an optimal strategy for the minimization of integral
cost (Prob. 3). Unlike in the minimization of the final cost (Prob. 1), there is no initial Inactivation period.
Figure 6 illustrates the control strategy designed in Theorem 6.5. In this example, 5 agents are to be con-
trolled optimally to reach consensus at the target velocity V = (1, 0). Initially (Figure 6a), only one agent is
controlled, the agent with the biggest projected velocity over v¯−V . The set J(t) = arg maxi∈{1,...,N}〈vi, v¯−V‖v¯−V ‖ 〉
contains more and more agents as time goes (6b, 6c) and eventually, control is split evenly among all agents
(see Figure 6d).
(a) t = 0.1 (b) t = 0.48 (c) t = 1.35 (d) t = 6.0
Figure 6: Control of 5 agents to reach the target velocity V = (1, 0). Agents are represented in the velocity
space, controlled ones in red, uncontrolled ones in blue, and the mean velocity in black. Initial positions are
marked by stars.
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Appendix
Proof. (Theorem 4.11) First, let ξ1(0) ≥ ξ2(0) > 0. According to Prop. 1.1, ξ1(t) > 0 and ξ2(t) > 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. The transversality condition gives λ1(T ) > 0 and λ2(T ) > 0, and according to Prop. 4.10,
λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) > 0 for all t ≤ T . According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle (see Section 4.1), the
global strategy requires setting α1 + α2 ≡ M . In this case, ξ¯(t) = ξ¯(0) exp(−M2 t) does not depend on the
choice of α1 and α2. Minimizing V (24) therefore amounts to minimizing (ξ1 − ξ2)2.
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(i) If T ≥ t2, we will show that in addition to satisfying α1 +α2 ≡M , the optimal control α must achieve
ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). Such a control strategy exists, since for instance (as one can see by direct computation
of (19)) the control (β1, β2)(t) = (1,M − 1) for all t ∈ [0, t2[ and (β1, β2)(t) = (M/2,M/2) for all
t ∈ [t2, T ] achieves ξβ1 (t) = ξβ2 (t) for all t ∈ [t2, T ], where ξβ denotes the corresponding trajectory.
Notice that β minimizes ξ¯(T ) by using the full strength M of the control at all time (see (25)), and
minimizes (ξ1− ξ2)2(T ), so it minimizes V(T ) (see (21)). Hence, in order to be optimal, α must satisfy
ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ) as well as α1 + α2 ≡M .
(ii) If T < t2, we will show that (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1) and that ξ1 and ξ2 cannot be brought together (i.e.
ξ1(T ) > ξ2(T )). Indeed, knowing that α1 + α2 ≡ M , one can use (20) to compute: (ξ1 − ξ2)(t) =
e−t
(
(ξ1 − ξ2)(0)−
∫ t
0
(α1 − α2)(s)ξ¯(s)esds
)
. Since ξ¯ is fully determined, tmin := minα∈UM ,α1+α2≡M{t ∈
[0, T ] s.t. (ξ1− ξ2)(t) = 0} is achieved by maximizing (α1−α2), which gives: (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M −1). As
seen previously, by direct computation of (19), tmin = t2 as defined above. Hence, if T < t2, necessarily
ξ1(T ) > ξ2(T ). Then λ1(T ) > λ2(T ) and according to Prop. 4.10, and to Prop. 3.1, λ1(t) > λ2(t) > 0
for all t. According to the PMP (see 4.1), the optimal strategy is (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1).
Now let ξ1(0) > 0, ξ2(0) < 0 and ξ¯(0) > 0. We then distinguish four subcases.
Firstly, let us prove that if ξ2(T ) > 0, then necessarily T > t1. Indeed, if 0 < ξ2(T ) ≤ ξ1(T ), then 0 <
λ2(T ) ≤ λ1(T ), and according to Proposition 4.10, 0 < λ2(t) ≤ λ1(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. According to the PMP
(see Section 4.1), α1 + α2 ≡M . Hence ξ¯(t) = ξ¯(0)e−Mt/2, and ξ2(t) = e−t(ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)
∫ t
0
(1− α2)e 2−M2 sds).
The minimum time tmin needed to achieve ξ2(tmin) > 0 is achieved for (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1), which, after
computation, gives tmin = t1 as defined above. Hence, if ξ2(T ) ≥ 0, then T > t1.
(iii) Let T ≥ t2. Let us prove that α1 + α2 ≡ M and ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ). Such a control strategy exists.
Indeed, take for example (β1, β2)(t) = (1,M − 1) on [0, t2] and (β1, β2)(t) = (M/2,M/2) on ]t2, T ].
Then, by direct computation of (19), ξβ1 (t) = ξ
β
2 (t) for all t ∈ [t2, T ] (where ξβ denotes the trajectory
corresponding to the control β). Furthermore, β is optimal since it minimizes ξ¯β by using full control
at all time and achieves (ξβ1 − ξβ2 )2(T ) = 0 (see (21)). In order to perform optimally, the control α
must also satisfy α1 + α2 ≡M and ξ1(T ) = ξ2(T ).
(iv) Let T < t0. Since t0 < t1, then as proved above, ξ2(T ) ≤ 0. Suppose that ξ2(T ) = 0. Then
λ1(T ) > λ2(T ) = 0 and according to Proposition 4.10, λ1(t) > λ2(t) = 0 for all time t. Hence,
α1 ≡ 1 (see Section 4.1). Then minα2{t ∈ [0, T ] s.t. ξ2(t) = 0} = t0 as defined above (obtained for
α2 ≡ 0). This contradicts the condition on T . Hence, if T < t0, then ξ2(T ) < 0 and according to
Proposition 4.10 and Section 4.1, λ2 < 0 so α2 ≡ 0. However, there is no information on λ1 other
than λ˙1 = α1/2λ1 + λ¯ − λ1 ≥ 0 and λ1(τ) = 0 implies λ˙1(τ) > 0. Hence, as in the previous sections,
there exists t∗ ∈ [0, T [ such that λ1 < 0 on [0, t∗[, λ1(t∗) = 0 and λ1 > 0 on ]t∗, T ]. This implies that
(α1, α2) = (0, 0) on [0, t∗[ and (α1, α2) = (1, 0) on [t∗, T [.
(v) Let t0 ≤ T ≤ t1. We shall prove that ξ2(T ) = 0 and that α1 ≡ 1. As seen previously, if T ≤ t1, then
ξ2(T ) ≤ 0. Suppose that ξ2(T ) < 0. Then λ1(T ) > 0 and λ2(T ) < 0 which according to Proposition
4.10 gives λ2(t) < 0 for all t, and according to the PMP (see Section 4.1), α2 ≡ 0. Then ξ2(t) =
e−t(ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)
∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0
1
2α1(r)dresds). Thus tsup := supα1{τ ∈ [0, T ] s.t. ξ2(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, τ [}
is obtained for α1 ≡ 1 and by direct computation, tsup = t0. Since T ≥ t0, there exists τ ≤ T such
that ξ2(τ) = 0. However, by Proposition 1.1, once ξ2 = 0 it cannot become negative again, which
contradicts ξ(T ) < 0. Therefore, ξ2(T ) = 0, and according to Proposition 4.10 and the PMP (Section
4.1), λ1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] so α1 ≡ 1. Furthermore, if ξ2(τ) = 0, then ξ˙2(τ) = (1− α2(τ))ξ¯(τ) > 0
since α2 = M − α1 = M − 1 < 1. According to Proposition 1.1, once ξ2 becomes positive it cannot
become zero again. Hence we must have ξ2(t) < 0 for all t < T and ξ2(T ) = 0.
(vi) Let t1 < T < t2. As in the previous case, since T ≥ t0, one must have: ξ2(T ) ≥ 0. Suppose
that ξ2(T ) = 0. Then according to Proposition 4.10 and the PMP, α1 ≡ 1 and ξ2(t) = e−t(ξ2(0) +
ξ¯(0)
∫ T
0
(1− α2)(s)e−
∫ s
0
1
2 (1+α2)(r)dresds). Then the minimum of ξ2(T ) is obtained for α2 ≡M − 1, so
ξ2(T ) ≥ e−T (ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)
∫ T
0
(2−M)e− 12Msesds) > e−T (ξ2(0) + ξ¯(0)(e
2−M
2 t1 − 1)) > 0
by definition of t1. This contradicts ξ2(T ) = 0, so necessarily ξ2(T ) > 0. Then λ1(t) > 0 and λ2(t) > 0
for all t, which implies that α1 + α2 ≡ M . In this case we prove as in case (ii) that ξ1(T ) > ξ2(T ),
which implies (α1, α2) ≡ (1,M − 1).
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